Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

CSCAP Study Group on Regional Peacekeeping and Peace-building

First Meeting

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Summary Note

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Opening Session

Introductory Remarks by Co-Chairs of Study Group

Mr. Wanandi and Dr. Lizee opened the meeting by welcoming the participants to Bali on behalf of CSCAP Indonesia and CSCAP Canada. Noting the diverse mix of experiences among the practitioners and scholars present, they appreciated the clear commitments and engagements that the participants brought to this two-day meeting.

Mr. Wanandi stressed the need to learn from the tsunami and increasing inter-dependence, the need to address natural as well as man-made security threats. Dr. Lizee recognized the fruitful cooperation with CSCAP Indonesia, and thanked them for the preparations for the workshop.

Session One: Defining the Problematique

Dr. Lizee provided an introductory overview to the meeting by addressing two main issues: (1) Problems of peacekeeping, and (2) What this CSCAP Study Group's preliminary agenda should entail, produce, through which process/methodology, and to which audience?

Dr. Lizee stressed that conflict resolution is not only negotiations and the political processes, but also a social process to transform societies. The Agenda for Peace in 1992 emphasized that building democratic institutions would diminish the risk for violent conflict. Differences of opinion and debates should resort to ballot boxes, instead of resorting to arms and violence. The challenges remain to bring about these social changes to enable a sustainable peace. Dr. Lizee identified three sets of main problems/challenges in this regard:

(a) Peace keeping addresses a new social contract. It will typically include new norms of human rights and attempts to energize the economy. The complexities of 'social engeneering' have in many contexts provided significant challenges, which need to be articulated. There is a need for 'sequencing': if the process of stability is not completed, the holding of free and fair elections is very difficult. Dr. Lizee exemplified the extreme complexities of the social changes brought about by peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, which saw an influx of funds, leading to inflation, with the result that peasants could not purchase the stables they had been using for generations.

(b) Peacekeeping addresses the political level. Those who will lose power will not want to see power reallocated. It is a central challenge to understand and address violence, security, stability and resistance to change. For example, there were fractions not wanting to take part in the process in Cambodia initiated by the UN. While wanting peace, some Cambodians preferred violent modes over the process suggested by the UN. Political resistance needs to be understood and integrated in the peacebuilding agenda.

(c) The mandate and function of peacekeeping. There has been a proliferation of tasks conducted by peacekeeping operations. Critics argue they have not coped well with this, and question whether the international community should return to more classic peacekeeping. Dr. Lizee questioned how one could construct the international consensus necessary to sustain long-term effective operations. What are the criteria of success to peacekeeping operations, and who should evaluate this?

Dr. Lizee continued by discussing developments in the CSCAP process, with the Steering Committee meeting in June 2004 re-energising CSCAP by creating Study Groups (replacing the former format of Working Groups). The Study Groups are intended to be short-lived, two years

at the most, and produce clear policy recommendation towards the end. The nature of a track-two process enables a forum to discuss also controversial issues in a non-confrontational, friendly manner. CSCAP Canada and Indonesia had suggested this 'CSCAP Study Group on Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding'.

More and more countries in the Asia-Pacific region have in recent years become involved in peacekeeping operations. These developments take place within larger conceptual and practical reconstructions in international relations, post-intervention in Iraq, and institutional developments at the United Nations. Note was made to the suggestions included in the UN High-Level Panel Report, including the idea of creating a Peacebuilding Commission. The current debate on the Peacebuilding Commission is on placement – should it be under Security Council or under ECOSOC (i.e. under 'peace' or 'development')? How are the US and regional actors steering these debates?

Dr. Lizee outlined the suggested process for the Study Group to articulate and add to ongoing debates: what do we want to say about which issues and to whom? The Study Group will convene on four occasions over the next 18 months. The next meeting will tentatively take place in September 2005 in Vancouver, with a third meeting in the early spring 2006, and a concluding fourth meeting scheduled for June 2006. At the end, a policy report will be presented, to be introduced to the wider CSCAP community and beyond. An edited volume could also come out of this process. Beyond the material output, the process itself is important. The exchange of information and development of personal contacts add to the 'habits of dialogue' within the region. There is a need to engage also with regional actors, and with the UN (which may be represented already at the next meeting).

Dr. Lizee concluded his presentation by arguing that the main question is the complexity of affecting social change to bring about sustainable peace. This meeting should define the process ahead in detail, in substantial and logistical terms. Common vocabulary should also be agreed upon.

The discussion that followed focused on the following themes:

- *Conceptual and substantial limitations.* One participant argued that the discussions must be focused, in order to add to efforts undertaken in other fora. Are we discussing preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-building experiences in this region? One participant stressed the inter-linkages between these stages of conflict resolution, should the Study Group also address peacemaking? Another participant questioned whether also the topic of conflict prevention through coercive intervention should be addressed, as it all forms part of one process/toolbox. Another participant stressed that there is rarely a luxury of timing between different stages of peacemaking/keeping/building, one has to build peace while it is being established, i.e. both need to take place at the same time.

One participant raised the question as to whether the focus should be substantively limited in scope, if inter-state as well as intrastate conflicts should be addressed, noting that the latter are increasingly dominant, while this opens up to various sovereignty issues. Another participant argued that the 'responsibility to protect' discourse has been perceived by many in the region as providing new tools for Western countries to intervene. It was argued that these norms and criteria need to be seriously studied and worked out, in order to make these issues palatable within this region. The participant concluded by stating that polling among elites in Indonesia demonstrates that this discourse holds significant support.

One participant questioned whether the Study group should address the activities of all actors, including governments, national actors, non-state actors, trans-national actors.

- Regional versus global. One participant argued that general discussions on UN reform could be addressed elsewhere, and that the focus of the Study Group should be on the Asia-Pacific region. Another participant argued that the Study Group needs to look beyond the particular Asia-Pacific region, as also regional organizations need to seek authorization from the UN Security Council when it comes to the use of force, preferably beforehand (or at least afterwards). Another participant stressed that peacekeeping operations should remain under the coordination of the UN, and that diversion should not be sought from Security Council authorization and principles of state consent. On the issue of UN authorization, another participant questioned whether there are differences between, for example, disaster relief operations and those where the use of force is required.

One participant argued that this region has always been hesitant to multilateral security cooperation, demonstrated by the unpreparedness of ASEAN to address the East Timor situation. The region is faced by a variety of non-traditional security challenges, of natural and man-made origin, which necessitate a range of actions, including preventive measures. While issues hampering tourism may not be referred to in 'conflict resolution' terms, it could become if mechanisms are not built to deal with cross-border issues, such as migration.

- Terminology. The need for common vocabulary for the work of the Study Group was repeatedly stressed, and it was suggested that 'UN language' should be the agreed terminology (as used in the Brahimi report). One participant also suggested it could be useful to define what 'conflict' refers to in the context of the Study Group.

- Audience for policy recommendations. One participant argued that it could be useful to feed into the ongoing debate at the UN, considering the UN Secretary-General report to Member States on the UN High-Level Panel Report in March 2005, member States subsequent reactions, and forthcoming debates and summits this year.

In concluding the first session, Dr. Lizee sensed from the comments made that the common understanding was that this CSCAP Study Group would primarily report to relevant regional organizations/actors and on regional matters. However, considering that these regional issues and reactions hold global implications, and UN interest in the outcome of the discussions, the Study Group should also seek to fit its contributions into the global debate. Furthermore, Dr. Lizee suggested that 'peacebuilding' is a good starting point for debate, and that the Study Group should not seek to cover the full spectrum of conflict resolution. It would be more useful to focus on one particular issue, present something useful on this point, and then move on to other issues.

Session Two: Case Studies

Case Study I: Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea

Mr. John MacFarlane presented the case studies, focusing on the contribution of the police component in the respective missions.

Mr. MacFarlane argued that despite references made in the Brahimi report, the international community commonly overlooks the importance of a functioning criminal justice system in post-conflict reconstruction situations, including in Iraq. Also, without property rights and institutions

to turn to, human security is a fiction. When under repression of gangs, little development can take place.

While the operation in the Solomon Island later became endorsed by the UN Security Council, the Papua New Guinea operation was strictly bilateral. The respective roles of military and the civilian police were presented, and their respective capacities should be seen as complementary.

On 2 Feb 2004 Australia announced a significant project to have a standing police arrangement with 500 police officers, which can be deployed at any time as the 'International Deployment Group' (ID Group). The role of this ID Group is to produce highly trained personnel, which are able to contribute in different missions.

Deployment of staff depends on the role, mandate and capacity development functions of each mission/program. To date, Australian police components have been deployed in some 10 different situations, including in Haiti, Cyprus, Jordan, Bougainville and several countries in Africa. Mr. MacFarlane briefly described several of these, including the training of Iraqi police in Jordan, which commenced in March 2004.

Solomon Islands. Mr. MacFarlane stated that Post-World War II tensions between Malaita and Guadalcanal, with the capital and political power moved from Malaita to the Guadalcanal city of Honiara, resulted in land claims and conflict. Armed inter-group violence broke out in 1998, and unfortunately Australia decided not to supply police to oversee elections 4-5 years ago (which the Solomon Islands government had requested). With a state effectively held to ransom by militia groups, a cabinet that could not convene, public staff unpaid, and the local police force corrupt and one-sided, Solomon Islands was on the verge of becoming a 'failed state'. This time the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. John Howard, called upon the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and a multilateral intervention with military and police drawn from the region took place under the PIF Biketawa Declaration.   The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) commenced on 24 July 2003, the first time Australian police were the lead agency in an international mission of this type. Police contingents were contributed from several countries, including Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand, with a total of 300 police.

The results were fairly successful, but should not be overstated. 3,730 weapons and 306,000 rounds of ammunition were confiscated. 3,117 arrests with 4,524 charges were made. 17 provincial police posts were established. By February 2005, the RAMSI military contingent withdrawal is almost complete.

On the negative side, an Australian police officer was killed in December 2004. Also, the police measures of arrests and weapon recovery have sparked opposing reactions, but the RAMSI operation is still strongly supported by the majority of the community.

Papua New Guinea. Following an overview of the events leading to the current situation, Mr. MacFarlane stated that the capacity of the police in this operation is not sufficient to address the breakdown of security. For example, in Port Moresby the crime rate is very high, largely due to significant numbers of unemployed youth engaged in different crimes. A recent World Bank report states this as the most dangerous capital in the world. There are numerous accounts of how beatings and sexual assaults are carried out routinely by the local police. Another challenge is the numerous hold-ups on the highway between Goroka Lae and Mount Wihelm, which is used for gold transportation. Endemic corruption and lack of confidence add to the cycle of problems.

210 Australian police are being deployed in phases under the Papua New Guinea Enhanced Cooperation Program, which includes capacity building and skills transfer. In addition, Australia is paying for 200 new police recruits. Other programs include the Law Enforcement Cooperation Program.

Case Study II: Cambodia

Ms. Noriko Sado stated that 11 years have passed since UNTAC left Cambodia. After implementing the election in 1993, Cambodia held national elections in 1998 and 2003, and local elections in 2002. These three elections were deemed largely free and fair by international election observation missions. The system with two Prime Ministers was a compromise at the Paris peace agreement, and in 1998 a single Prime Minister structure was introduced. The Khmer Rouge was dissolved substantially in 1998, while the trial and prosecution controversies remain. Despite support after UNTAC, development has not been enough. The education system is weak, corruption rampant, and the national election committee not sufficiently independent.

Ms. Sado noted that the mandate of the UNTAC in 1992 was very comprehensive, authorized to deal with disarmament, cease fire monitoring, election, civil structure, refugee and displacement, human rights and infrastructure. UNTAC is largely viewed as a successful operation which prevented armed conflict and for its support in developing a more democratic system.

Ms. Sado reiterated the lessons that many researchers have pointed out in this regard, including the importance of the human resources in the host country. By leaving substantial implementation to the Cambodian government, UNTAC could leave at an early stage. The 'core group approach' of the peace process was successful (including the US, Australia, Japan and Thailand). It was also pointed out that UNTAC was responsible for peacekeeping, not peacebuilding (which differed from, for example, the operation in East Timor), and largely achieved its core mission in this regard. The UNTAC experience was a forerunner vis-à-vis other UN-led administrations, such as Kosovo. However, Ms. Sado concluded that UNTAC left the international community with many challenges unresolved.

Case Study III: East Timor

Dr. He-Ran Song presented the case study of the peacekeeping operation in East Timor. UNTAET was a comprehensive mission, and operated in cooperation with the government. Logistical and infrastructure challenges were huge when the mission was started. The Asian contribution to UNTAET was significant, and included Chinese participation. Japan sent a self-defense front. Korea contributed army personnel, and Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia all contributed.

Dr. Song provided a varied set of observations from an 'Asian' perspective:

- There are comparatively fewer Asians in peacekeeping mission at the decision-making level, also in UNTAET (despite significant Asian contributions). The under-representation in this regard is particularly poignant when it comes to East Asians, i.e. Japanese, Koreans and Chinese. A deputy head of mission raised this very issue in a resignation letter, that 'Asian missions are being run by non-Asians'.

- UN has experience working with OSCE and African regional and sub-regional organisations, but not with regional organizations in Asia. Could it be beneficial to develop a regional system in Asia with which the UN could coordinate?

- According to a New York University research paper, the priority of the major (Permanent 5) UN member states when it comes to establishing peacekeeping operations is: Europe, Latin America, Africa, and last, Asia.

Dr. Song argued in favor of regional approaches, and the need for integrated sector approaches and simulation activities (ex. military-police cooperation/coordination). Particular recommendations to the military included the need to recruit and deploy women soldiers, who can be effective also when it comes to information gathering, and better suited to discuss with female victims. The role of human rights informed female police is equally important. Deployments should be made to the greatest extent with those holding relevant linguistic skills.

Discussion

One participant identified divergences between the case studies, while stressing the need for phasing and coordination among all stakeholders.

- *Solomon Islands.* The efforts of peacemaking. Series of failed negotiations in the Solomon Islands. Solomon Islands defined to as institution building. Whether a state is really the way to go. The issue of nation-building, remains a great deal of tensions. Reconciling but also come to terms with land reform.

- *Cambodia.* One participant pointed out that the UNTAC deployment was the outcome of years of negotiation and agreement, with involvement of the major parties (including USA and France), and the need for the involvement of key stakeholders from the outset of negotiations.

- *East Timor.* It was pointed out that second UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General was followed by an Asian (from India). Another participant argued that the level of empowerment in East Timor should be included in defining 'success' of peacekeeping operations. However, as the UN will soon be leaving East Timor, there is a need for regional actors to step in.

- *Regional organizations.* It was recognized that there has been a swift in the latest years, with peacekeeping operations becoming more 'localized': in Europe it is mostly Europeans involved, in Asia mostly Asians and Africa mainly Africans. This was recognized as an appropriate development of the UN.

One participant observed that Asia does not yet have the institutionalized organizations capable to assist in peacekeeping operations. The need for this was exemplified when ASEAN could not formulate a common policy towards Cambodia towards the end of the 1990s, and not send troops to East Timor. One participant concurred and argued that the increasing resources available to be mobilized within the region should lead to closer Asian cooperation in this regard. Another participant highlighted the UN attempt to activate regional coordination 10 years ago, and that the response to the tsunami could lead to regional capacity placed in Singapore, and argued that this could be extended also to UN peacekeeping operations.

- *NGO – military coordination, including in disaster relief.* While recognizing the importance of increasing the understanding between military and NGOs, one participant mentioned that a three-day conference in Cambridge to this end appeared to have rather widened the gap between these communities. One participant observed how media and NGOs have their own agendas, and who

they can ask for assistance while not having headed security advice earlier. It is a hard decision to take for a military commander in these cases to send out soldiers to bail them out.

This said, it was recognized as crucial to involve locals in civic action and health programs. In fact, military doctors often spend more time with civilians than servicing military personnel.

The difficulties of relationships between military, civilian and NGOs – becoming sharper not smoother. NGOs becoming more economic minded. With military taking more civilian duties, there is a sense of NGOs.

One participant opposed the perception that military can not deal with humanitarian issues, and argued that military is probably a pioneer of delivering humanitarian assistance. Other participants commented on these challenges, and stressed that peacekeeping needs particular functions which are significantly different from humanitarian assistance. One participant argued that narrow concepts not to the benefit of all, and that it needs coordination to determine which actors come in at what points, and with which mandates. It was recognized that lessons from Cambodia and East Timor should be drawn form the complexities of the mandates, and the sequencing of coming in when security is ready.

- *Land soldiers.* The question was raised whether there is a need to include also naval and other military forces other than land soldiers in peacekeeping operations. One participant recalled that in Somalia there was a naval component on the coast; also with regard to MONUC and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In these cases they played more of a deterring factor than an actual military role. One participant argued that the main relevancy of land soldiers in land-bound conflicts was obvious: 'if we would make peace in the air, we would use air force, if we make peace at sea, we would use naval forces'.

- *Failed states.* One participant argued that UN involvement remains to be successful in dealing with 'failed states', which characterizes several Pacific Islands countries with their intra-state conflicts. Another participant observed that the effectiveness and relevance of preventive diplomacy is limited when it concerns 'failed states'.

- *Success criteria?* The success of external support depends on the interest of the warrying parties to implement relevant agreements. One participant argued that when conflicting parties do not genuinely want to cooperate, this is why and when mediation is needed to keep the peace, which was the case for example in Somalia. In intra-state situations there tend to be more actors, in forms of different militia forces, which makes mediation efforts more complex.

One participant stressed the need to define criteria to assess whether a mission has been successful or not. Deeper and local knowledge needed of different factions, which is often difficult to obtain. Solomon Islands was held as a success, with the collection of weapons having taken place without a single shot been fired. Another participant argued that one is essentially speaking about gambling, there can be no guarantee of whether any peacekeeping operations will be successful or fail. One participant stressed that doctrine in this regard would be useful if this could be developed.

One participant reflected on the relation between success and exit strategy. Another participant doubted that the UN has elaborated 'exit strategies'. If regional players want to see reform, and this is in their regional interests, maybe they should determine when it is time to leave? One participant stressed that this issue should be addressed in the Study Group policy recommendations.

Session Three: The UN and Changing Forms of International Conflict Resolution

Presentation by Brigadier (Retd.) Roger Mortlock

Brigadier Mortlock shared some reflections from his experiences as former Commander in Angola 1992 and in Bougainville in 1997-1998. While one can criticise the UN, there is no alternative global organization. Regional peacekeeping, however, is in growth mode. Brigadier Mortlock articulated the challenges of peacekeeping operations by drawing on 'The Philosophy of Ior' quotes.

- *'Nobody minds. Nobody cares. Pathetic that's what it is'.* The Angola mission was not seriously funded. The first Angola mission was going to fail, and it was known. Peace is only achievable if the belligerents deeply desire it.

- *'If you follow your own footsteps... you'll only find the road to nowhere'.* The ability to craft a sound strategy, from the mandate or negotiated agreement and to measure that it has potential for success should also be recognised as preconditions for intervention.

- *'Even if someone remembers to come to your birthday party, they will probably eat the present on the way'.* It is necessary to ensure that it is physically possible to send an intervention force of the design and mandate needed. In Angola, 28 nations were involved in the military element of UNAVEM II.

- *'A True friend will desert you in your time of need.'* Having led the largest retreat in UN peacekeeping history, Brigadier Mortlock argued that the Angola experience was among the worst in the history of the UN, and forms part of a collective shame, along with the UN inaction surrounding the Rwanda genocide. A new suite of conflict-ending needs to be developed and taught as an international military curriculum (drawing on positive examples such as Bougainville), with new doctrines needed for leadership and authority.

Brigadier Mortlock stated that any intervention raises the hopes of desperate peoples. Therefore, an intervention deserves careful, original planning and implementation that caters for the needs, culture, and conditions of the host peoples. To do anything less is irresponsible and cruel. Once an intervention takes place, anything less than to succeed is unforgivable.

Brigadier Mortlock concluded his presentation by identifying the following principles or lessons learnt:
- The essential pre-condition for an intervention is that the people actively desire peace, so that they will influence their leaders and doubting peers accordingly;
- Mandates have to be workable;
- Troop arrangements have to give full effect to the mission intent;
- Missions have to be 'purpose-designed';
- Missions have to be planned to last the distance, i.e. to stop the war and win the peace.

Presentation by Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Satish Nambiar

Lt. Gen. Nambiar referred to his more comprehensive report which was submitted in the course of his work as Member on the UN High-Level Panel. Following his experience as the first Force Commander and Head of Mission of the UN Forces in the former Yugoslavia, Lt. Gen. Nambiar identified four types of international operations: (a) Classic Chapter VII interventions, for

example the first Gulf War. There are not 'blue helmet' cases, the oppressor has been clearly identified and the international community gets together and acts; (b) Classical Chapter VI missions, which includes peacekeeping, such as in Cyprus and Eritrea. These 'blue helmut' operations will continue for some time, but are manageable; (c) Robust UN peacekeeping. These are distinct from Chapter VI operations by operating in an intra-state environment. In order to deal with renegade/spoilers, the main belligerents need to get together under a robust mandate, which includes the use of force, and be provided with the resources necessary. These operations could also be included in the 'blue helmets' category; (d) Stabalisation missions. These refer to non-UN but still multilateral arrangements, labeled as 'Afghanisation'. These are different from 'blue helmet' operations, and can be lead by a regional organization, or a lead country.

- *The use of force.* Lt. Gen. Nambiar argued that despite all that is written on the subject (incl. so-called Chapter VI 1/2 arrangements), by imposing restrictions on ourselves in the implementation of our activities, the international community has over the years not used the flexibility as provided for in the UN Charter. We must be allowed the use of force, under some circumstances, and provided the adequate mandate and resources.

- *Participation in UN peacekeeping.* Lt. Gen. Nambiar did not see the UN to hold the capacity of providing strategic direction, which a commander needs. The western world is not conferring this to the UN, and the western world has partly turned away from UN peacekeeping. Westerners are often largely sitting in New York or in laison offices.

- *UN Standby arrangement.* Currently, it takes approximately six months to gather the troops for an operation. By this time, the conditions on the ground may likely have altered. A stand-by arrangement would still be dependent on the decision to be taken by the member States. In 1994, 17 countries were in support of stand-by arrangement, but not one came. When drafting the UN High-Level Panel report, it was deemed that this suggestion would still not be approved, and it was therefore not included in the report.

Lt. Gen. Nambiar concluded by stressing the role of regional capacities, which hold vested interests, and the importance of regional organizations acting within their own regions to keep the UN informed. However, concern was raised for situations when regional organizations act outside of their regional scope.

Presentation by Mr. Omar Halim

Mr. Halim drew on his experiences from four peacekeeping missions: Namibia, Lebanon, Somalia and Liberia.

Peacekeeping is not in the UN Charter, and it was due to the ingenuity of the former UN Secretary-General Mr. Dag Hammarkjold, who drew on UN Charter Article 41 mandating the Security Council to undertake 'provisional measures' until a long-term solution is found. When the Soviet Union dissolved, intra-state conflict flourished in several contexts, such as Somalia and the horn of Africa. Local forces had the opportunity to assert power. Missions became much more complex, no longer tasked 'just' to separate forces. Challenges included dealing with non-state actors, with combatants who all looked the same with no uniforms, but equipped with AK-47s.

The challenge remains to ensure that commitments made are fulfilled. We lost credibility slowly by including 'threats' in the Security Council resolutions. Scare tactics can be used once, maybe twice, but it loses its significance if done repeatedly.

The S-G has, subsidiary to the Security Council, the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council if a threat to the peace is identified. For this the S-G needs the 'operendus modendi'. Drawing on the four criteria the former S-G Boutros Ghali provided, the tools available to the S-G include: (1) Identify root causes; engage in preventive diplomacy, which necessitates early warning systems and sending missions and information and analysis (the UN largely lacks this capacity, including deep knowledge of local issues and actors); (2) If violence has erupted; peacemaking; (3) Preventive deployment; peace operation; and (4) Peacebuilding.

Providing facilitation to address intra-state conflicts are even more complex than inter-state. Even if the UN is able to come up with a plan on paper, the UN currently lacks the capacity to adequately assess whether the parties concerned are willing and capable to meet those commitments.

The basis of the UN is its 'moral authority'. When the UN is not impartial, or not perceived as being impartial, the basis of UN legitimacy is eroded. The reason why the UN was attacked in Baghdad may have been symptomatic, as the UN was not perceived as being neutral.

The S-G, the Assistant S-Gs, and the DPKO must be able to provide directional guidance, and ensure enforcement. The UN has been successful when dealing with traditional peacekeeping under Chapter VI. When going beyond the traditional peacekeeping, the UN has experienced difficulties. In discussions of a stand-by force, could the UN really remain neutral at all times?

The trend of UN operations is that, due to the common inability of the UN Security Council, the UN places more emphasis on national governments. If they are not effective towards achieving the aims, then the regional organizations can step in. The UN in increasingly considered a last resort, following the subsidiary principle.

What principles should guide when regional alliances partake outside their regional scope? Should, for example, the transatlantic NATO deal with Iraq, and Afghanistan? Do we want NATO to be involved in Southeast Asia? The Organisation of American States (OAS) was used for Haiti. In Liberia, it was Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), which appears appropriate as they are closer to the problem.

Ideas for an Asia-Pacific conflict resolution system? If talking about lessons from the UN, there are selective contributions of mechanisms that are in place. The ARF exists, but its current role remains limited. Mr. Halim concluded by arguing that the UN should limit its involvement to traditional Peacekeeping operations (i.e. not complex emergences), and also support in the peace-building phase.

Discussion

- *Intelligence.* It was observed that the word 'intelligence' is taboo in the UN (i.e. the UN should have no enemies, so there should be no need for spying). One participant questioned how a military commander can operate effectively in a context without intelligence, without obtaining and assessing this information. One participant stated that as the concept of peacekeeping and the role of the military has developed vastly over the past 15 years, the use of intelligence has become less central. However, several participants emphasized that without intelligence, a

commander cannot protect his or her troops, and that there are ways to effectively overcome these deficiencies in an informal manner on the personal level. While officially no intelligence can be undertaken, in fact the political section of missions tend to supply intelligence, albeit irregularly. One example was given where an infantry soldier was brought on a mission, and informally running an intelligence unit. This information on the ground proved vital for subsequent actions. One participant argued that if a commander is not allowed to gather intelligence officially, there is a moral duty to do it unofficially. One participant recalled an example where individuals were tasked to contribute to intelligence gathering, including gathering information picked up over radio, information from rebels, and cross-referencing of rumors.

However, there are also examples of when intelligence is not shared on the ground. This was the case in former Yugoslavia, where forces sent from NATO countries to former Yugoslavia did not want to share intelligence with their commander on the ground.

The question was raised whether moves towards increased reliance on regional arrangements will affect the levels of intelligence available.

- Regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific for peacekeeping operations? One participant stressed that significant peacekeeping capacity existed within the region, incl. among South Asian countries. Explorations should be made as to which institutional framework would be most appropriate, and it is increasingly clear that the region does not necessarily need to rely on the USA and/or Europe. One participant stressed that widespread political reluctance remained in this regard, in particular when it comes to considering in-regional coercive multilateral arrangements which could potentially be used in intra-state conflicts. One participant doubted whether it was realistic for any regional multilateral standing peacekeeping arrangement to be developed in Northeast, East or Southeast Asia, while there could be a greater chance for this ahead in the Pacific Islands system. However, it was noted that there could be resistance from within the UN system to such operative and organized arrangements, unless it is limited to storage and logistical deposition.

However, it was observed that global trends are bending towards regional perspectives, including but not only for financial reasons. Following the 26 December 2004 tsunami, India sent a first aircraft to Sri Lanka on the same day, and ships to Indonesia. The contributions of Singapore, China and Japan have been significant. Disasters tend to mend people together and promote confidence. The tsunami has indeed enabled direct contacts and coordination of aid, which provide structures that are analogous to more peacekeeping related missions. On this note, one participant argued that a clear distinction needs to be made between frameworks for humanitarian assistance and frameworks for peacekeeping operations. It was reiterated that there exists to date no regional mechanism which enables, or could lend itself for, peacekeeping and peace-building in Asia-Pacific.

One participant pointed out that the support system under OCHA to react to complex disasters, incl. in Iran, Bangladesh, and the recent tsunami, largely relies on sending experts and equipment from Europe, in order to assist the local disaster teams. This meant significant costs just to send the machineries necessary. The tsunami appears to have made counties seek to play a more proactive role in addressing common challenges, and a system in this regard with Singapore as a base is currently being set up and likely to be agreed upon in March 2005.

- UN Charter considerations and peacekeeping history. One participant observed that the UN has conducted some 59 Peacekeeping operations since 1948. While the UN is currently carrying out 16 Peacekeeping operations with some 70,000 personal, costing 4 billion USD in 2004, the

needs and demands to perform more diversified tasks are rising substantially. One participant stressed that also the North-South divide must be tackled to avoid insecurity ahead.

One participant observed that the UN Charter Chapters VI and VII were constructed from a military point of view, and argued that the civilian component under Chapter VII is not the contested issue, but rather the military role under chapter VI that is debated. One participant argued that the presentations demonstrated the great level of complexities in the UN operations, including bureaucracy, while now confronted with reform that will force them to improve.

Session Four: Defining the Future of Peacekeeping and Peace-Building

Presentation by Dr. Paul D. Hughes

Dr. Hughes observed that many mistakes had been made by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. He stressed the importance of integrated and coordinated planning for post-conflict reconstruction between military and civilian at an early stage. Dr. Hughes offered an analysis based on three functional topics: (1) security (2) economics and (3) governance.

1. Security. The planning for post-war in Iraq was largely done under the U.S. Ministry of Defense, which had the effect to excluding many experts. The planning for reconstruction in post-war societies needs to begin at a very early stage to alleviate suffering, in order to establish a safe and sound environment. There will be painful trade-offs, as winners and losers will be created. Most actions undertaken will be viewed by distrust from some quarter. As there are few straight policy choices, the need for flexibility is great.

In the military, immediate results are sought, and this approach can bring about unintended long-term instability. For example, emergency relief funds were given to have Iraqis restart power stations and clean up, but there was no sustainability to continue the benefit established, absence of which can have brought about more insecurity. Border security, military and police from within is crucial, in the absence of trusted order. Border control with customs and duties limits external flows of bad elements and limits the smuggling of national treasures.

Civil police tasks are not best done by military. Specialized personal is needed to restore the rule of law, and the military should focus on addressing counter-insurgency. If civilian functions are not reestablished, the risk is that a 'failed state' will emerge, affecting regional security. Saddam Hussein released all prisoners, some 130,000, with a view that they would assist in fighting through paramilitaries. Some did, but many returned to robbery and other criminal activities. It is not easy for the police, armed with AK-47s, to deal with thugs who are equipped with machine guns and heavy weaponry.

2. Economics. Successful economic development has been treated as a top priority. This meant building on indigenous programs, but insufficient programs with unsatisfactory policy guidance limited the positive effects. The lack of indigenous capability to carry out tasks is problematic as time passes, and without clear timelines, this causes further problems. Investors who commit are needed, foreign debt should be viewed as a forgivable item, and micro-grants should be made available for the middle class, to support stabilization.

3. Governance. The recent elections were very good considering the situation, while few voters may have grasped the concept of democracy. The first challenge is to maintain unity. In Dr. Hughes's talks with individuals in Iraq, persons referred to themselves as *Iraqis* first and

foremost. Nonetheless, there is an urgent need to assist in bringing in the 'losers' so that they are included in the political process, including in the upcoming drafting of a Constitution for Iraq (i.e. the Sunnis). It can still be argued whether local or national elections were the best option, however, local elections would have been difficult considering the lack of census.

Current concerns include internally displaced persons, whom in Kirtuk have reached the third generation. The result has been an increase in property claims.

Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) needs to be planned in the initial phase in an integrated manner, or else seeds will be planted for further conflict. However, the US government is poorly organized to conduct and coordinate reconstruction. This said, former Secretary of State, Mr. Colin Powell established a unit within the State Department to provide the Secretary directly with reconstruction and policy analysis. This unit also manages a register of persons whom the Secretary can call upon, conducts assessments to identify potential hotspots for preventive action, and a training facility. Important in this regard is the recent establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

It is a challenge to identify what 'success' is in post-conflict reconstruction. While Garner was seeking to restore capability to Iraq, did this imply restoration to the level of before 1991, before the 2003 invasion or to some other level? Unless one knows what one wants to achieve, one should not do it. Similarly, if political will and/or resources are lacking, plans should not be undertaken. It was suggested that 'effectiveness' could be an issue for this CSCAP Study Group to analyse further.

Dr. Hughes concluded his presentation by arguing that winning the war is not enough, also the peace must be won. Crucial to this is the power of ideas, as the gun will not make people decide that their idea is wrong. Information must be related and conveyed to the local people. Insurgency will be the norm of future conflicts. It is through ambiguity that insurgencies can recruit, through skillful misinformation and intimidation. The insurgents will fight a protracted war, sometimes take military steps and then retreat, as they have time on their side. Anyone wants to assist in securing environment must be willing to take the time to do so. Urbanisation brings further challenge to conflict resolution, as the infrastructure will be damaged, which brings up the cost in conflicts. The average Iraqi is less concerned of insurgents, and more concerned about crime. What matters is if their children can go to school, if they can go to work and go to the market. The challenge is to find better ways of enabling the power of ideas to resolve conflicts.

Presentation by Dr. Mely C. Anthony

Dr. Anthony highlighted three issues that had emerged during a recent Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) conference on the new challenges to UN peace operations and its effect on Asia: the changing nature of conflicts, the changing concept of security, and the change of strategies in Peacekeeping operations. Conflicts tend to increasingly be internal conflicts. More resources provided and an increase of UN peacekeeping operations indicates that there are currently more conflicts to be addressed. Traditionally, Peacekeeping operations had a tendency to bring back security to the state, but less to the individuals. The introduction of the concept of 'human security' and 'non-traditional security threats' will define approaches of how to address them more comprehensively. The Brahimi report recognizes that one of the hallmarks of the UN is the more proactive peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations have gone beyond 'blue helmet keeping of peace', to also take part in post-conflict reconstruction. Whereas peace

keeping is seen as an activity, post-conflict reconstruction brings longer-term questions, and raises questions as to who should do it and how.

The Brahimi report provided three major recommendations: provision of financial resources, the need for a clearer organisational structure and capacity of the UNDPKO, and the need for achievable mandates.

Many consultations have taken place, while views from Asia have not figured prominently. On the issue of clearer mandates and success, when considering resources and people, a significant part of the peacekeeping operations are coming from the developing world. There are legitimate concerns of lack of representation in the process of formulating mandates. The decision-making remains within the Security Council and the five permanent members. It is increasingly necessary to revisit this composition in light of new geopolitical realities. If developing countries are to be more active, they should also be given stronger voices.

There remains a lack of preparation and realization, with actions being reactive rather than preventive. Important in this regard were the UN Secretary-General report on the Prevention on Armed conflict, and the 'Responsibility to Protect' report (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001).

- The S-G Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict (2001). The S-G report stresses the need for preventive deployment strategies, and asks the regional organizations to take an active part in this regard. However, there remains a lack of institutional structures to address prevention effectively and timely. In Asia, ASEAN and ARF exist, but despite time passed, these are still very limited institutions in this regard. ASEAN has been characterized by informal studies and consultations. ARF does relate more towards confidence building measures; if these would move towards conflict resolution capacity, the questions of internal conflicts becomes challenging for several governments.

Dr. Anthony suggested that this CSCAP Study Group could analyse this issue further, considering that the ARF has been in existence for over a decade, and with recent voices in the region pushing for more preventive diplomatic capacities. The ASEAN Security Community and its adopted Plan of Action, as suggested by Indonesia, holds potential in this regard. Also, a regional human rights commission could be envisioned, together with a development of certain norms.

- Responsibility to Protect (R2P) The Responsibility to Protect report was presented in the end of 2001. It was recognized that the norm for non-interference in domestic affairs needed to be re-looked. The R2P report highlights on prospects of intervention, and requires States to be more responsible actors. Apart of the onus of the state to protect human rights, in order for a state to protect its sovereignty, a state must also be able to ensure that the human rights of the persons living within the state are respected.

Given that the state has lost its prerogative of sovereignty when human rights are breached, who is to mandate a 'humanitarian intervention'? CSCAP looked in 1999 at 'humanitarian intervention' and the discussion of which criteria apply. It must be recognized that many states hold reservations and concerns in this regard, as they largely see this as remaining a prerogative of strong states for intervention.

Dr. Anthony stated that the two reports mentioned highlight the regionalization of Peacekeeping operations. With regard to China, it was in Cambodia that China moved beyond being observers

to actually participating in a Peacekeeping operation, and from this moment established itself as a constructive player in the region. But the more active role of China also raised concern and provided a dilemma with regard to potential internationalization of its domestic issues. Japan's increased involvement in Peacekeeping operations can be seen as a way to strengthen its case to obtain a permanent seat in the Security Council. However, increased Japanese activism has also resulted in regional concerns whether this could mean a return to Japan militarization.

The active roles of China and Japan raise some issues of the region to address with regard to peacekeeping operations. What are the prospects and willingness to further integrate in line with Europe or Africa? It may be premature to look at the issue of humanitarian intervention. While the R2P concept may have cast this in a more constructive and palatable manner, the R2P remains widely perceived as a way for the stronger states to intervene in weaker states. The significant barrier that needs to be overcome is the principle of non-interference.

Increased regionalisation of Peacekeeping operations also prompts the question of how to make use of civil society networks in Peacekeeping operations and promote mutual understanding. An IDSS researcher dispelled in a recent study the common perception that military would not want to engage with NGOs; according to this study, the case was in fact the opposite - the NGOs were less open to engage with the military. On the note of NGOs, it was also recognized that in addition to international NGOs, it is important to seek local NGOs to be partners in peace-building. Issues of NGOs facilitating dialogues and to sensitize civil society are issues which have not yet been looked at carefully enough.

Dr. Anthony concluded by arguing that there is a need to differentiate between frameworks for humanitarian assistance and intervention.

Presentation by Col. Nopadon Munkalaton

Col. Munkalaton stated that Thailand has seen an exponential increase in participation in peacekeeping operations since 1991. His presentation highlighted the future of peacemaking, the role of troop contributing states, and the work in the troop contributing centre of Thailand.

Col. Munkalaton gave overview accounts of the Peacekeeeping operations where Thailand has participated, including the international force in the Korean War (1950-1953), UNGCI in northern Iraq (1991-1994), UNTAC (1992-1993), INTERFET and UNTAET in East Timor (1999-2002), the Aceh Monitoring Mission (2002-2003) and Afghanistan as part of the Operations Enduring Freedom (Mar-Sep 2003).

Certain factors affects Thailands participation in a mission: mandate and timeframe (time often prolonged), end state and exit state, optimal point of success, military planning and preparing for the mission, logistics issues, composition of the Peacekeeping force. Officers see fringe benefits from participating, as one month of work in the south of Thailand equals one day pay in a UN peacekeeping operation.

Issues that affect the decisions of the Troop Contributing Center of Thailand with regard to Peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding operations, include the influences of major Asian powers (ASEAN, China, Japan), superpowers and other world powers, and the direction of the UN (UNSAS, RDL, Strategic Reserve, reflection from Comprehensive Review).

Col. Munkalaton concluded by discussing evolving principles in relation to future forms of Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding, and suggested the use of 'Peace Operations' as a concept instead, as

this could also include election assistance etc.. Col. Munkalaton also suggested a Regional Peacekeeping Center, to function as a coordinating center for regional peacekeeping centers, and the exchange of instructors, training courses and exercises at different levels, including for High Level Planning Staff.

Discussion

- *US policies.* A few questions addressed how US policies are viewed outside the US and how the US will engage with the UN post-Iraq in Bush's second term? One participant observed that the depth of the impact of 9/11 remains the basic misunderstanding between the US and the rest of the world. The sympathy from the world of the impact in human and economic terms of 9/11 translated into international support for the intervention in Afghanistan. The 'axis of evil' labeling in 2002 was however ill-advised and inflammatory. The administration considered Saddam Hussein to be a regional threat and to the world. The argument of WMD was elevated, while uncertain, also at the time, of how strong the case was for a nuclear threat. The capabilities for biological and chemical are everywhere. Bush sought multilateral support, and those who choose to stand with the US did so with good intentions. One participant stated that Iraqis at large are pleased that Saddam Hussein is no longer in power. Some decisions were made in the vacuum in Washington, and we have to live with them. Bush believes he has accepted the challenges and opportunity to make a difference, and will see it through. One participant stated that if a state wants multilateral support, it needs to play by multilateral rules.

It was argued that among positive developments were the new budget line of reconstruction, and that the Department of Defense will not be given the task of reconstruction again. One participant argued that multilateralism is being undermined, due to US unilateralism. When discussing what to do, what went wrong, we need to recognize that we are at a juncture, multilateralism cannot be taken for granted. When the UN acts that way, the whole system is disturbed. It was argued that the intervention in Afghanistan was justified, due to their harboring of Al-Queda, but in Iraq it was significantly different. One participant stated that the US approach had been arrogant, not providing a real room for dialogue. If countries wanted to join, they were welcome to, and countries joined for their own reasons.

- *Lesson from Iraq: not as peacekeeping but for reconstruction.* One participant argued that the Iraq operation can teach us important lessons of how to deal with terrorism, however, for the work of this CSCAP Study Group, it is not a Peace operation per se and it was suggested that one should be cautious to include Iraq as a case study for this reason. However, it was agreed that there were lessons that could be drawn from reconstruction experiences there.

One participant noted some errors done after the initial war, for example when Bremer aquitted the army. Considering that these are the potential enemy, they should have been taken care of. The military are professional and want a career, not supporting Saddam. Much money spent, but small projets with immediate effect on people are the ones that are appreciate and convince people to calm down. One participant also pointed out the crucial importance of strategic communications in the battle of having ideas conveyed in order to win the peace.

- *Responsibility to Protect (R2P).* One participant questioned whether the R2P report was fully endorsed by S-G Annan. The High Level Panel held lengthy discussions on whether to endorse this concept/approach, and the High-Level Panel report does include references to it. It will however depend on what this year of UN reform will bring about. The issue of transgressing of national sovereignty continues to draw reservations from the developing world.

- Corporations in conflict zones. One participant brought up the role of the corporate sector in the activities ahead, and the role of mercenaries. This note was developed by another participant stressing the involvement of private military companies in conflict zones (often comprised of former military staff). The nature of conflict needs logisticians able to work with local companies, for example Haliburton. The US has cut down on non-combat soldiers, which has resulted in the need for private contractors to provide support to US troops. What are their rules of engagement? Who are they accountable to? Do the Geneva conventions apply to them? These are current topics being discussed at the Red Cross, with potential normative initiatives forthcoming.

- Regional Peacekeeping Center. Support was expressed for the idea of a joint regional peacekeeping training center, to promote common understanding and to develop personal relations. In noting the agreement for the proposal of a regional peacekeeping center around the table, one participant suggested that CSCAP should re-launch this idea? One participant was intrigued that Indonesia has been a driving force behind ideas of a regional peacekeeping center, considering strong nationalistic senses and the multitude of internal situations. It was pointed out, however, that it remains to be clarified whether the Indonesian government sees this exclusively for potential application outside the ASEAN, i.e. for purposes of UN missions elsewhere.

- Training. Two participants noted that there already exists several training programs in the region, and it was suggested that mapping and reviewing existing resources in the Asia-Pacific could be a role for this Study Group. One participant argued that the missing link is the training between the military, police and civilian worlds, and should target participants among policy-makers, academics, NGOs, police and military.

Session Five: Group Discussion on Two Central Themes

Dr. Lizee described this session to look at the themes of defining the challenges, and to define the role of the Study Group. He narrowed this done further:
1. What shall we study in the study group: what is our objective, what shall we leave out?
2. How shall our work differ from others?
3. How do we organize this? Who attends? Where are we going? 18 months from now, we need to present a policy report. What audience? What agenda?

1. Dr. Lizee suggested that topics for this Study Group be limited to Peacekeeping and Peace-building, and to address these also from a social process perspective. This would rule out including 'humanitarian intervention', 'unilateral intervention' and 'classic peacekeeping'. With a case study on Cambodia, for example, the Study Group could analyse how the military, NGO community, academia and politicians have rebuilt societies.

A second element is 'timing': the value of this Study Group is to be current. When the Study Group re-convenes in September 2005, this meeting will be held around the time of the Millennium Development Goals UN meeting in September. The value of our Study Group will be to plug into these debates, including on the ideas of establishing a UN Peacebuilding Commission and regional peacekeeping centers, by analysing the positions of our different countries and our subsequent reactions to amended proposals on the table?

2. Dr. Lizee suggested that the next meeting should discuss: 'current developments', controversial issues such as the Indonesian proposal of an ASEAN Peacekeeping force (the nature of it rather

than'risks' of using it), policing, definitions of success, the design of exit strategies which correspond to 'success', coordination between military and NGOs, how do norms of R2P and the ASEAN Way interact? What are the incentives of Japan and China of taking a much more active role (incl. engagement in Haiti), what vision of multilateralism does this reflect? Case studies could be used which might shape the issues in this region. The next meeting will be more focused, on special issues, how different actors in the region are reacting to these debates.

3. What audience does the Study Group have? Dr. Lizee noted that there is no need to settle on this now, but what is the direction? Perhaps a two-step process: a) present findings to CSCAP and to the governments of this region, and b) take part in global discussion on the basis of local and regional realities. At the next meeting, a UN presence will be sought, with a view to have the final report circulated also within the UN.

Discussion

- *Name of Study Group, conceptual and regional focus.* One participant suggested that the name of the Study Group could be changed to 'Regional Peace Operations'. With regard to peacebuilding, could one include regional practices such as the Malaysia's role vis-à-vis southern Thailand and the southern Philippinnes? Could this be linked to the mediation part? There are nascent mechanisms in place, if only in part institutionalized. These experiences could fit well considering moves towards an ASEAN Security Community, discussions of EEPs and early warning systems, and the ARF. Maybe it could be worthwhile re-visiting these, and how they could function, or why they do not function. Looking at issues as infectious diseases, early warning systems, health surveillance systems etc. could fit within the peace-building concept, and mitigate issues of sovereignty, as the countries are mainly inviting expertise.

One participant stressed the need for the Study Group to identify how the region's institutions can be complementary to the UN, to what the UN can and cannot do.

One participant argued that the UN is doing good work in the sphere of traditional peacekeeping. There seems to be trend towards engaging the regional organizations for the more complex Chapter VII emergencies, for example relying on NATO and the African Union. However, it was argued that the Study Group should not focus on this, as it is not realistic in this region in the foreseeable future. In terms of the Study Group, it was argued that the group is well-equipped to cover peace-building, peacemaking and training of negotiation, to promote the perspective of peaceful coexistence. The expertise at different levels could be tabulated.

What 'region' are we talking about? Not 'only' ASEAN, our footprint should include the South Pacific, which includes the Pacific Islands Forum.

- *Governing Body, Case Study Teams and Study Points.* It was suggested to organize participants in Case Study Teams, tasked to produce a case study to the next meeting. A Governing Body would provide support and guidance to define case study scope and aims, and also work out common language and definitions. Case Study Teams could include academics, diplomats, police, military and NGO expertise, and through joint analysis, this would also be an exercise in consensus-building.

A brainstorming of Study points provided these ideas: Military-police-civilian relationships; preconditions for intervention; defining 'success'/'effectiveness'; 'strategies', including 'donor strategies'; 'regional opportunities'; 'force options'; 'soft power techniques options'; 'workable mandates'.

- *Audience.* It was suggested that the policy recommendations in the end would be disseminated to the CSCAP community, governments, regional inter-governmental organizations, international financial institutions, non-governmental organisations, research institutions, and interested individuals (ex. ARF Eminent Expert Persons). One participant suggested that we aim for a publication with a well-recognised publisher. Another suggestion was to develop a regional lecture series. The dissemination of existing training programs was also deemed useful.

Dr. Lizee concluded the session by saying that based on this workshop and all comments, a framework with suggestion for issues will be worked out and circulated in May. This will include suggestions for papers/issues for next meeting (which will see presentation of the work of the case study groups). Pending comments on this, by June there should be a clear plan of how to bring things forward to the next meeting which is likely to be held in the fourth week of September 2005 in Vancouver. In the meanwhile, Dr. Lizee was suggesting that the discussion can be kept going by suggesting persons for the study groups, and expanding our network.

In parallel, reporting will be done to the broader CSCAP community, with the next CSCAP steering committee meeting to be held in the end of May in KL. Also, the next CSCAP General Meeting will be held in the end of 2005. There are ideas to broaden the Steering Committee meeting to include also policymakers from the region, and there have been suggestions to bring in media.

CSCAP Study Group on Peacekeeping and Peace-building

- Organisation of work 2005-2006 -

CSCAP Canada, CSCAP Indonesia Coordination, definitions, Terms of Ref

Case Study Team I	Case Study Team II
Case Study Team III	Case Study Team IV
Case Study Team V	Case Study Team VI

Analysis of case studies: principles and philosophy
Meeting sin September 2005 and spring 2006

June 2006 meeting
Adoption of Policy Recommendations
Publication, Regional Lecture Series, Resource List

Concluding Session

Dr. Lizee and Amb. Wiryono closed the meeting, by noting the fruitful exchanges over the past two days, thanking the presenters for framing the issues with their expertise and looking forward to further joint collaboration. Dr. Lizee expressed his gratitude for the close personal relationships developed over the past days, and thanked on behalf of all participants CSCAP Indonesia, for their arrangements enabling this meeting.